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Abstract
We present an implementation of the Owen value (Owen, 1977), inspired by the
bidding mechanism introduced by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). The idea
is the following: first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanism trying
to obtain the resources of the coalition. Later, players who obtained the resources
play the bidding mechanism in order to share the surplus.
1 Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is one of the most important solution concepts in
cooperative game theory. Since the paper of Shapley was published, many authors have
been studying this value. For instance, Myerson (1980) characterizes it using the property
of balanced contributions. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) do so by using the potential and
the property of consistency. Moreover, the Shapley value has been used successfully in
cost allocation problems and the analysis of political situations.
Another important aspect of a normative solution is the non-cooperative founda-
tion, or implementation. The idea is to prove that agents can reach the cooperative
solution through a non-cooperative behavior. Indeed, given the cooperative game, a non-
cooperative game is associated in such a way that the outcome of some kind of equilibrium
of the non-cooperative game coincides with the solution of the cooperative game. There
are several implementations of the Shapley value (for instance, Gul (1989), Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996), and Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)).
Owen (1977) studied situations in which players are partitioned into groups. In this
context Owen introduced the Owen value, which is a generalization of the Shapley value.
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Later, several authors extended other results of the Shapley value to the Owen value.
Calvo, Lasaga, and Winter (1996) extended the results about balanced contributions, and
Winter (1992) studied the results about the potential and consistency. Also, the Owen
value has been used in cost allocation problems (Va´zquez-Brage, van den Nouweland,
and Garcia-Jurado (1997)) and political situations (Carreras and Owen (1988)).
Nevertheless, the non-cooperative foundation of the Shapley value has not been ex-
tended to the Owen value. In this paper we extend the results obtained by Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001) and we implement the Owen value.
Given a cooperative game, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) define a non-cooperative
game called the ”bidding mechanism”. They prove that the payoff of all subgame perfect
Nash equilibria outcomes coincides with the Shapley value of the cooperative game. In
the bidding mechanism there are three stages. In Stage 1, players bid to become the
proposer, where bids can be negative or positive. The player with the highest ”net bid”
(the difference between the sum of the bids he makes to the others minus the sum of the
bids the others make to him) becomes the proposer and pays the bid to the other players.
In Stage 2, the proposer makes an offer to the other players. In Stage 3, the other players
answer the offer. If everybody accepts the offer, the grand coalition is formed, the pro-
poser pays to the other players according to the offer, and obtains all the resources of the
grand coalition. If some player rejects the offer, then the proposer is removed obtaining
his own resources. The rest of the players play the bidding mechanism among themselves.
Given a cooperative game, we define a non-cooperative game called the ”coalitional
bidding mechanism” and we prove that the payoff of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria
outcomes coincides with the Owen value of the cooperative game.
The coalitional bidding mechanism has two rounds. Assume that the coalition struc-
ture is {C1, ...,Cm}. In Round 1, the members of any coalition Cl, independently of the
other coalitions, play the bidding mechanism among themselves. Then for any coalition
Cl we can find a player, called the representative, who obtains the resources of coalition
Cl, or a subcoalition of Cl if some player is removed because his offer was rejected. In
Round 2, the representatives play the bidding mechanism among themselves, taking into
account the resources obtained in Round 1.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notation and definitions.
In Section 3 we define formally the coalitional bidding mechanism and we prove that it
implements the Owen value. Finally, in Section 4 we present some concluding remarks.
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2 The model
First, we introduce the notation used throughout this paper. Let (N,v) be a game with
transferable utility (TU game), where N = {1,2, ..., n} is the set of players and v is the
characteristic function, which assigns a real number v(S) to every coalition S ⊂ N . We
assume that v(∅) = 0. Following usual practice, we often refer to ”the game v” instead of
”the game (N,v)”. We denote by TU (N) the set of all TU games on the set of players
N . We denote by TU the set of all TU games
For each game v and S ⊂ N we denote by v∣S the game v restricted to S (vS (T ) = v (T )
for any T ⊂ S). Moreover, v−i = v∣N∖{i}.
A coalition structure for N is a partition C = {C1, ...,Cm} , i. e. Ck ∩Cl = ∅ if k ≠ l
and
m⋃
l=1Cl = N. We assume that a coalition structure C = {C1, ...,Cm} is given and fixed.
Given S ⊂ N we denote by C∣S the restriction of C to the members of coalition S, i. e.
CS = {Cl ∩ S ∣ Cl ∈ C and Cl ∩ S ≠ ∅} . Moreover, C−i = C∣N∖{i}. We denote by TU (N,C)
the set of all triples (N,C, v) where N is the set of players, C is a coalition structure for
N , and v is a characteristic function. We denote by CTU the set of all triples (N,C, v) .
To each coalition structure C and each game v we define by vC the game induced by
v by considering the coalitions of C as players. Then for any Q ⊂ C, vC (Q) = v ( ⋃
Cl∈QCl).
Let Ω (N) be the set of all permutations on N . We say that pi ∈ Ω (N) is admissible
with respect to the coalition structure C if for any i, j, k ∈ N, i, k ∈ Cl ∈ C, and pi (i) <
pi (j) < pi (k) imply that j ∈ Cl, where pi (i), pi (j), pi (k) denote the position of i, j, and k
in the permutation pi. We denote by Ω (N,C) the set of all admissible permutations on
N with respect to C.
We say that v is: superadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) when S ∩ T = ∅, strictly
superadditive if v(S)+v(T ) < v(S∪T ) when S∩T = ∅, zero-monotonic if v (S)+v ({i}) ≤
v (S ∪ {i}) when i ∉ S, and strictly zero-monotonic if v (S) + v ({i}) < v (S ∪ {i}) when
i ∉ S. Note that if the game is superadditive (strictly) then it is zero-monotonic (strictly).
Given (N,C, v) ∈ TU (N,C) the Owen value (Owen, 1977) is defined as :
φi (N,C, v) = 1∣ Ω (N,C) ∣ ∑pi∈Ω(N,C) [v (P pii ∪ {i}) − v (P pii )] for all i ∈ N
where P pii = {j ∈ N ∣ pi (j) < pi (i)} and ∣ Ω (N,C) ∣ denotes the cardinality of the set
Ω (N,C) .
If C = {{1} , ...,{n}} or C = {N} then the Owen value is given by
φi (N,C, v) = ∑
S⊆N∖{i}
∣ S ∣! (n− ∣ S ∣ −1)!
n!
[v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S)] for all i ∈ N
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which coincides with the Shapley value of the game v. Usually we denote by φ (N,v) the
Shapley value of v.
It is well known that for any triple (N,C, v) and for any Cl ∈ C, ∑
i∈Cl φi(N,C, v) =
φCl(C, vC) where φCl(C, vC) denotes the Shapley value of Cl in the game vC .
A value on G ⊂ CTU is a map ϕ ∶ GÐ→ IRN .
We say that a value ϕ on G satisfies:
Efficiency if for any (N,C, v) ∈ G, ∑
i∈N ϕi(N,C, v) = v(N).
Additivity if for any (N,C, v1), (N,C, v2) ∈ G and i ∈ N ,
ϕi(N,C, v1 + v2) = ϕi(N,C, v1) + ϕi(N,C, v2)
where (v1 + v2)(S) = v1(S) + v2(S) for any S ⊂ N .
Balanced contributions among players if for any (N,C, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ Cl ∈ C,
ϕi(N,C, v) − ϕi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) = ϕj(N,C, v) − ϕj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i) .
Balanced contributions among coalitions if for any (N,C, v) ∈ G and Ck,Cl ∈ C,
∑
i∈Ck ϕi(N,C, v) − ∑i∈Ck ϕi (N ∖Cl,C∣N∖Cl , v∣N∖Cl) =
∑
i∈Clϕi(N,C, v) − ∑i∈Clϕi (N ∖Ck,C∣N∖Ck , v∣N∖Ck) .
Owen (1977) proved that the Owen value satisfies efficiency and additivity. Later,
Calvo et al. (1996) proved that also satisfies balanced contributions among players and
coalitions.
3 The coalitional bidding mechanism
Given a cooperative game (N,v), Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) design a non-
cooperative game, called the bidding mechanism. They prove that the payoff of any
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE from now) of this mechanism always coincide
with the Shapley value of the cooperative game (N,v). Thus, this mechanism implements
the Shapley value in subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
In this section we extend the bidding mechanism to cooperative games with a coalition
structure. The idea is quite simple. There are Round 1 and Round 2, and Round 1
contains stages 1 through 3. In Round 1, players in the same coalition play the bidding
mechanism in order to obtain the resources of this coalition (or a subcoalition if some
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player is removed). The player who obtains the resources is called the ”representative”.
In Round 2, the representatives play the bidding mechanism with the resources obtained
in Round 1.
We now present the coalitional bidding mechanism (CBM) formally.
If there is only one player i, he obtains v ({i}). Assume now that we know the rules
of the coalitional bidding mechanism when played by at most n − 1 players. Then, for a
set of players N = {1, ..., n} and coalition structure C = {C1, ...,Cm}, the CBM proceeds
as follows.
1. Round 1. In this round, the players of any coalition Cl ∈ C play the bidding
mechanism trying to obtain the resources of Cl. Formally, if there is only one
player i, then this player has his resources. Assume now that we know the rules
when played by at most ∣ Cl ∣ −1 players. For Cl proceeds as follows.
(a) Stage 1. Each player i ∈ Cl makes bids bij ∈ IR for every j ∈ Cl ∖ {i}. For each
i ∈ Cl, we takeBi = ∑
j∈Cl∖{i} bij− ∑j∈Cl∖{i} bji . Assume that αl = argmaxi{Bi}. In the
case of a non-unique maximizer, αl is randomly chosen among the maximizing
indices.
(b) Stage 2. Player αl, called the proposer, makes an offer y
αl
i to every player
i ∈ Cl ∖ {αl}.
(c) Stage 3. The players of Cl∖{αl}, sequentially, either accept or reject the offer.
If a rejection is encountered, we say the offer is rejected. Otherwise, we say
the offer is accepted.
The coalitions of C play sequentially in the order C1, ...,Cm until we find Cl0 and
αl0 such that the offer of αl0 is rejected or for any Cl ∈ C the offer of αl is accepted.
In the first case, player αl0 pays b
αl
i to every player i ∈ Cl ∖ {αl} and leaves the
non-cooperative game obtaining v({αl0})− ∑
i∈Cl0∖{αl0} b
αl0
i . All players other than αl0
proceed to play the CBM with (N ′,C ′, v′) where N ′ = N∖{αl0}, C ′ = C−αl0 , and v′ =
v−αl0 . Any player i ∈ Cl0 ∖ {αl0} obtains as final payoff the sum of the bid received,
b
αl0
i , and the payoff outcome of the mechanism corresponding to (N ′,C ′, v′). Any
player i ∈ N ′ ∖ Cl0 obtains as final payoff the payoff outcome of the mechanism
corresponding to (N ′,C ′, v′).
In the second case, for any Cl ∈ C, player αl pays bαli +yαli to every player i ∈ Cl∖{αl}
and becomes the ”representative” of coalition Cl. This means that player αl goes to
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Round 2 with all the resources of Cl. Moreover, the payoff obtained by this player
in this round is p1αl = − ∑
i∈Cl∖{αl} (bαli + yαli ). Any other player i ∈ Cl ∖ {αl} leaves the
non-cooperative game obtaining a final payoff of bαli + yαli .
After finishing Round 1, for any Cl ∈ C we can find the representative (denoted
by rl) of this coalition. When there is only one player in a coalition, he becomes
the representative of himself. Moreover, we denote by Crl the set of players whose
resources are obtained by player rl. Notice that Cl ∖ Crl is the set of removed
proposers in Cl. Of course Crl ⊂ Cl and rl ∈ Crl .
2. Round 2. The representatives play the bidding mechanism (Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein, 2001) associated with the game (N r, vr) where N r = {r1, ..., rm} and for
any S ⊂ N r, vr(S) = v ( ⋃
rl∈SCrl ). For any representative rl, we denote by p2rl the
payoff obtained by rl in Round 2.
The final payoff obtained by any representative rl is the sum of the payoffs obtained
in both rounds, i. e. p1rl + p2rl .
We must note that the CBM terminates in a finite number of moves.
Gul (1989) analyzed a cooperative game where random meetings between two agents
occur. At each meeting, a player (randomly chosen) makes an offer to the other. If this
offer is accepted, the proposer buys the resources of the other player. In the bidding
mechanism played by any coalition the situation is, in some way, similar. There is also
a player (αl) who makes an offer trying to obtain the resources of the rest of players
(Cl ∖ {αl}). The differences are that in the bidding mechanism it could be possible that
more than two players are involved and, moreover, the proposer is not randomly chosen.
In Round 1, we assume that coalitions play the bidding mechanism independently.
Moreover, when Stage 3 of the bidding mechanism of some coalition Cl ends, players
of Cl must announce to the other coalitions if they have an agreement or not. If they
have not an agreement (in this case the proposer, αl, is removed), then we suppose that
the coalitions that have already achieved an agreement can renegotiate it. Assume that
coalition Cp achieves an agreement but after knowing that player αl has been removed
some player in Cp thinks that the agreement is not good. Then the agreement achieved
is cancelled. In such case, the players of coalition Cp play the bidding mechanism again.
In Round 2, the representatives of every coalition play the bidding mechanism with
the resources obtained in Round 1. This round coincides with the bidding mechanism of
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
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Remark 1. In Round 1, we assume that coalitions play the bidding mechanism in
the order C1, ...,Cm. Our results are independent of the order in which coalitions play
the bidding mechanism. Moreover, if the order is chosen according to some probability
distribution over the set of all possible orders, our results are still valid and independent
of the probability distribution.
Remark 2. Assume that the offer of player αl is accepted for any l < l0, but the offer
of αl0 is rejected. Then a new subgame begins, which coincides with the CBM associated
to (N ∖ {αl0},C−αl0 , v−αl0) .
Remark 3. According to the CBM, the agreement achieved by every coalition Cl with
l < l0 is, somehow, cancelled. We can include in the CBM an intermediate step between
the rejection of the offer of αl0 and the CBM applied to (N ∖ {αl0},C−αl0 , v−αl0). Assume
that for any coalition Cl, l ≠ l0, the players of Cl vote whether they prefer to continue
with the agreement achieved or not. If at least one player wants to cancel the agreement,
it is cancelled. It is easy to check that all the results obtained in this paper are also valid
if we include this intermediate step.
Before the characterization of the SPNE outcomes of the coalitional bidding mecha-
nism we need the following result.
Proposition 1. Given a triple (N,C, v) such that v is zero-monotonic, j ∈ Cl ∈ C,
and {j} ≠ Cl then
∑
i∈Cl φi (N,C, v) ≥ ∑i∈Cl∖{j}φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) + v({j}).
Proof. We takeM = {1, ...,m} and define the following games onM : w(T ) = v ( ⋃
a∈T Ca)
for any T ⊂M ; w1(T ) = v ( ⋃
a∈T Ca) if l ∉ T and
w1(T ) = v ( ⋃
a∈T∖{l}Ca ∪ (Cl ∖ {j})) if l ∈ T ; w2(T ) = 0 if l ∉ T and w2(T ) = v({j}) if l ∈ T ;
and w′ = w1 +w2.
Since v is zero-monotonic we obtain that w(T ) = w′(T ) if l ∉ T and w(T ) ≥ w′(T ) if
l ∈ T . Hence φl (M,w) ≥ φl (M,w′). Since the Shapley value satisfies additivity we have
φl (M,w′) = φl (M,w1) + φl (M,w2).
We know that φl (M,w) = ∑
i∈Cl φi (N,C, v) , φl (M,w1) = ∑i∈Cl∖{j}φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j),
and φl (M,w2) = v({j}). This concludes the proof. ∎
Remark 4. Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Proposition 1 we
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can prove that if v is strictly zero-monotonic, j ∈ Cl ∈ C and {j} ≠ Cl, then
∑
i∈Cl φi (N,C, v) > ∑i∈Cl∖{j}φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) + v({j}).
First, we prove that the Owen value is the payoff of an SPNE outcome.
Proposition 2. Given a triple (N,C, v) where v is superadditive, the Owen value
φ(N,C, v) is the payoff of an SPNE outcome of the coalitional bidding mechanism.
Proof. If there is only a player the result is trivial. Assume that the result holds with
at most n − 1 players.
We consider the following strategies.
• Round 1. First, we define the strategies in the bidding mechanism associated to
any Cl ∈ C.
Stage 1. For any i ∈ Cl, bij = φj(N,C, v) − φj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i) for any j ∈ Cl ∖ {i}.
Stage 2. Player αl, the proposer, offers y
αl
j = φj (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) to every
j ∈ Cl ∖ {αl}.
Stage 3. Any player i ∈ Cl ∖ {αl} accepts the offer of αl if and only if yαlj ≥
φj (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) for every j ∈ Cl ∖ {αl}.
If some offer is rejected, for instance, the offer of αl0 , we go to the subgame where all
players other than αl0 play this mechanism in (N ∖ {αl0},C−αl0 , v−αl0) . We assume
that players in N ∖ {αl0} play according to the strategies profiles of some SPNE
with payoff associated φ (N ∖ {αl0},C−αl0 , v−αl0) (by induction hypothesis we can
find such SPNE).
• Round 2. We assume that players of N r play according to the strategies described in
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) when they construct, for any zero-monotonic
game, an SPNE that yields the Shapley value of this game as an payoff outcome.
First, we prove that according to these strategies any player i ∈ N receives as payoff
the Owen value φi(N,C, v). We must note that the offer of any αl is accepted. Then
player αl goes to Round 2 as the representative of Cl.
Any player i ∈ Cl ∖ {αl} obtains bαli + yαli =
φi(N,C, v) − φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) + φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) = φi(N,C, v).
We now compute the payoff of any representative rl. As v is superadditive we have
that vr is zero-monotonic. By Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), we know that the
8
payoff obtained by rl in Round 2 (p2rl) coincides with the Shapley value of (N r, vr). Then
the final payoff obtained by rl is






i + φrl (N r, vr)
= − ∑
i∈Cl∖{rl} (φi(N,C, v) − φi (N ∖ {rl},C−rl , v−rl))− ∑
i∈Cl∖{rl}φi (N ∖ {rl},C−rl , v−rl) + φCl (C, vC)= − ∑
i∈Cl∖{rl}φi(N,C, v) + ∑i∈Cl φi(N,C, v)= φrl(N,C, v).
We now prove that these strategies are an SPNE. As v is superadditive, (N r, vr) is
always zero-monotonic. By Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) we conclude that in the
subgames obtained after Round 2 these strategies induce an SPNE.
By induction hypothesis, in all the subgames obtained after the rejection of the offer
of some proposer αl, these strategies induce an SPNE.
We only have to prove that these strategies induce an SPNE in the bidding mechanism
associated to any coalition Cl.
Stage 3. Assume that player i rejects the offer of αl. Then the coalitional bidding
mechanism of (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) is played and, by induction hypothesis, after the
rejection player i can obtain at most φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl). Hence, if player i rejects
the offer of αl, he obtains, at most,
bαli + φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) = φi(N,C, v).
This means that player i does not improve his payoff.
Stage 2. If player αl offers to some player i ∈ Cl less than φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl), the
offer is rejected and, therefore, player αl obtains a final payoff of
v (αl) − ∑
i∈Cl∖{αl} (φi(N,C, v) − φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl)) .
By Proposition 1, this payoff is not larger than φαl(N,C, v), which means that player αl
does not improve his payoff.
If player αl offers to any player i ∈ Cl ∖{αl} at least φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl) , the offer
is accepted. It is straightforward to prove that player αl obtains at most φαl(N,C, v).
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j∈Cl∖{i} (φj(N,C, v) − φj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i))− ∑
j∈Cl∖{i} (φi(N,C, v) − φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j)) .
As the Owen value satisfies balanced contributions among players, we have that for any
j ∈ Cl ∖ {i},
φi(N,C, v) − φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) = φj(N,C, v) − φj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i)
and hence Bi = 0.
Assume that player i ∈ Cl makes a different bid b∗. If B∗i < 0, the proposer will be
another player of Cl. Then player i can not increase his payoff.
If B∗i > 0, he becomes the proposer but he must pay ∑
j∈Cl∖{i} b∗ij to the other players of
Cl ∖ {i}. It is straightforward to prove that player i can obtain, at most, a final payoff of







which is smaller than φi(N,C, v).
If B∗i = 0 and player i is not the proposer, using similar arguments to those used when
B∗i < 0, we can conclude that player i does not increase his payoff. If B∗i = 0 and player
i is the proposer, using similar arguments to those used when B∗i > 0 we can conclude
that player i does not increase his payoff. ∎
There exist superadditive games such that the associated coalitional bidding mecha-
nisms have SPNE outcomes whose payoff is different from the Owen value.
Example 1. Consider (N,C, v), where N = {1,2,3,4}, C = {C1,C2}, C1 = {1,2},
C2 = {3,4}. Moreover, v is the characteristic function associated to the weighted majority
game where the quota is 3 and the weights are 1, 1, 1, and 2 respectively. This means
that v(S) = 1 if and only if S contains some of the following subsets: {1,2,3}, {1,4},{2,4}, or {3,4}.
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It is straightforward to prove that



































We now define an SPNE whose payoff outcome is (0,0, 14 , 34).
Round 1. First, we describe the strategies of players 1 and 2. The bids are b12 = b21 = 0.
Then, the proposer α1 is randomly chosen between 1 and 2. Moreover, y
α1
j = 0 and player
j accepts the offer of α1 if and only if α1 offers him something positive.
We now describe the strategies of players 3 and 4. In the subgame obtained after
the offer of α1 is accepted, the strategies of players 3 and 4 coincide with the strate-
gies whose payoff outcome is the Owen value. We know that these strategies exist by
Proposition 2. In the subgame obtained after the offer of α1 is rejected, the strategies of
players 3 and 4 coincide with the strategies whose payoff outcome is the Owen value of(N ∖ {α1},C−α1 , v−α1).
Round 2. We assume that players of N r play according to the strategies described in
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), which implement the Shapley value.
It is not difficult to check that these strategies are an SPNE.
According to these strategies, the offer of player α1 is rejected, which means that player
α1 obtains a final payoff of v (α1) = 0. Then players of N ∖ {α1} obtain as final payoff
φ (N ∖ {α1},C−α1 , v−α1). This means that the final payoff induced by these strategies is(0,0, 14 , 34).
If we want to implement the Owen value, we have to make more assumptions. We
make two kind of assumptions: first, about players’s behavior in Round 1, and second,
about the class of cooperative games.
About players’s behavior Moldovanu and Winter (1994) say, ”We assume that each
player prefers to be a member of large coalitions rather than smaller ones provided that
he earns the same payoff in the two agreements”. Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) say, ”To
facilitate exposition we will assume that both proposers and respondents break ties in
favor of quick termination of the game”.
11
If we make in our framework the same assumption that Moldovanu and Winter (1994),
we implement the Owen value. The same happens with the assumption by Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996).
In order to simplify the exposition, in our model we suppose that if some offer yα
of proposer α in Round 1 is rejected by player j, then both players (α and j) have a
”punishment” ε > 0 where ε is very small. Note that with this punishment players prefer
large coalitions rather than smaller ones and ”both proposers and respondents break ties
in favor of quick termination of the game”. We call this modification the ε-CBM.
We now define the ε-CBM formally. The structure of the non-cooperative game, bids
and offers is the same in CBM and ε-CBM. This means that the strategies available
for players are the same in both games. The only difference between CBM and ε-CBM
lies on the following aspect of the payoff function in Round 1. Assume that for any
Cl ∈ C, l < l0 the offer of player αl is accepted and the offer of αl0 is rejected by player j.
Then αl0 leaves the non-cooperative game obtaining v({αl0})− ∑
i∈Cl0∖{αl0} b
αl0
i −ε (in CBM,




j ∈ Cl0 ∖ {αl0} obtains as final payoff the sum of bαl0j − ε, and the payoff outcome of the
mechanism corresponding to (N ′,C ′, v′) (in CBM player j obtains as final payoff the sum
of b
αl0
j and the payoff outcome of the mechanism corresponding to (N ′,C ′, v′)).
Theorem 1. For any ε > 0, the ε-CBM implements the Owen value in SPNE for
superadditive games.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of players. If there is only one player
the result is trivial. Assume that if there is at most n− 1 players the ε-CBM implements
the Owen value in SPNE and, moreover, all the offers of Round 1 are accepted. We now
prove that the same holds when there are n players.
Consider the strategies defined as in Proposition 2 but with bij = φj(N,C, v)−φj(N ∖{i},C−i, v−i)+ε and yαlj = φj (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl)−ε for any Cl ∈ C, i ∈ Cl, and j ∈ Cl∖{i}.
Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, we conclude that
these strategies are an SPNE whose payoff outcome is φ (N,C, v) .
We now prove that the payoff in all SPNE outcomes coincides with the Owen value.
We do it in several steps.
The structure of this proof is similar to that of the main result by Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001). The proof of Step A is completely different. The proof of steps B, C,
and D is similar although the computations are different.
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Step A. At every SPNE outcome, and for every Cl ∈ C, the offer of the proposer αl to
each player i ∈ Cl ∖{αl} is yαli = φi (N ∖ {αl},C−αl , v−αl)−ε and every i ∈ Cl ∖{αl} accepts
this offer.
Assume that in each coalition Cl ∈ {C1, ...,Cm−1}, the offer of a proposer αl ∈ Cl is
accepted, and consider the subgame starting with the last coalition Cm. Let αm ∈ Cm be
the proposer in Cm. Let yαm be an offer of αm. Let the order of reply of the players in
Cm ∖ {αm} be i1, ..., ik.
Claim 1: At every SPNE, the strategies of the players in Cm∖{αm} must be as follows:
(i) If yαmi > φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε for every i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} , then every i ∈
Cm ∖ {αm} accepts yαm .
(ii) If yαmj < φj (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε for some j ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} , then some player
in Cm ∖ {αm} rejects yαm .
(i) Consider the strategy of the last player ik. Assuming that his decision node is
reached, if he accepts the offer yαm , then he receives bαmik + yαmik , whereas if he rejects yαm ,
then by the induction hypothesis he obtains bαmik +φik (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm)− ε. Hence,
at any SPNE, if yαmik > φik (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm)−ε, then ik accepts the offer. Repeating
the same argument backwards, we can show that players ik−1, ..., i1 accept the offer.
(ii) Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists j ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} with yαmj < φj(N ∖{αm},C−αm , v−αm)−ε, but all the players in Cm∖{αm} accept the offer yαm . Then, player
j receives bαmj + yαmj . However, if player j deviates and rejects the offer, then he obtains
bαmj +φj (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm)−ε, which is greater than bαmj +yαmj . Hence, the strategies
of the players in Cm ∖ {αm} cannot constitute an SPNE.
Claim 2: At every SPNE outcome, every i ∈ Cm∖{αm} accepts the offer of the proposer
αm.
Suppose, to the contrary, that at some SPNE outcome, there exists i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm}
who rejects the offer yαm . Then, the proposer obtains




Let δ > 0 be given. For each i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} , define zαmi (δ) by
zαmi (δ) = φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε + δ.
Suppose that the proposer αm proposes zαm (δ) . By Claim 1 (i), for any δ > 0, every
i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} accepts zαm (δ) . Hence, player αm is the representative of coalition Cm in
Round 2. Now, in Round 2, there are m players {α1, ..., αm} , where, for any coalition
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Cl ∈ C, αl is the representative of coalition Cl. As the representatives are playing an SPNE
of the bidding mechanism associated to (N r, vr) , by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
we know that the payoff obtained by player αm in Round 2 is φαm (N r, vr) = φCm (C, vC) =∑
i∈Cm φi(N,C, v). Then, the final payoff of player αm is
∑
i∈Cm φi(N,C, v) − ∑i∈Cm∖{αm} [φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε + δ] − ∑i∈Cm∖{αm} bαmi
= ∑




By Proposition 1, we know that
a = ∑
i∈Cm φi(N,C, v) − ∑i∈Cm∖{αm}φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − v ({αm}) ≥ 0.
Then, if 0 < δ < a+∣Cm∣ε(∣Cm∣−1) , the payoff of αm obtained by offering zαm (δ) is greater than
that obtained by offering yαm . Hence, to offer yαm cannot be an SPNE strategy of the
proposer αm, which is a contradiction.
Claim 3: At every SPNE, and for every i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} ,
yαmi = φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε.
Let yαm be the offer of αm at an SPNE. By Claim 2, yαm must be accepted by ev-
ery i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} . Then, it follows from Claim 1 (ii) that for every i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} ,
yαmi ≥ φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε. Suppose that for some j ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} , yαmj >
φj (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm)− ε. Let τ = yαmj − [φj (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε] > 0. For each
i ∈ Cm ∖ {αm} , define wαmi = φi (N ∖ {αm},C−αm , v−αm) − ε + τ∣Cm∣ . Suppose that the pro-










the proposer αm obtains a greater payoff by offering wαm than by offering yαm . Hence, to
offer yαm cannot be an SPNE strategy, which is a contradiction.
Repeating the same arguments for coalitions Cm−1, ...,C1, we can prove Step A.
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Step B. Assume that we are in Stage 1 of Round 1 of the bidding mechanism
associated to Cl ∈ C. Then in any SPNE, Bi = 0 for any i ∈ Cl.
It is straightforward to prove that ∑
i∈ClBi = 0. We take X = {i ∈ Cl∣Bi = maxj∈Cl Bj} . If
X = Cl, the result holds because ∑
i∈ClBi = 0.
If X ≠ Cl, we get a contradiction by proving that player i ∈ X has a deviation which
improves his final payoff. We take j ∈ Cl ∖ X such that Bj ≥ Bk for any k ∈ Cl ∖ X.
Assume that player i makes a new bid b′i, where b′ik = bik + δ if k ∈X ∖ {i}, b′jk = bjk − ∣X ∣δ,
and b′ik = bik if k ∈ Cl ∖ (X ∪ {j}).
For any k ∈ Cl, we compute B′k assuming that b′k = bk for any k ∈ Cl ∖ {i}. Then
B′k = Bk − δ if k ∈X, B′j = Bj + ∣X ∣δ, and B′k = Bk if k ∈ Cl ∖ (X ∪ {j}).
Since Bj < Bi, we can find δ > 0 satisfying Bj + ∣X ∣δ < Bi − δ. Moreover, X ′ ={k ∈ Cl∣B′k = max
h∈Cl B′h} = X. This means that any player of X is the proposer with the
same probability under bi and b′i. When player i is not the proposer, which happens with
probability ∣X ∣−1∣X ∣ , he obtains, by Step A, the same making a bid bi or b′i. But if player i
is the proposer, which happens with probability 1∣X ∣ , he obtains, by Step A, δ units more
with b′i than with bi.
Step C. Assume that we are in Stage 1 of Round 1 of the bidding mechanism as-
sociated to Cl ∈ C. Then, at every SPNE, the payoff of any player i ∈ Cl is the same
regardless of who is chosen as the proposer.
By Step B, we know that Bi = 0 for any i ∈ Cl.
Assume that some player i strictly prefers to be (not to be) the proposer. Then player
i can improve his payoff by slightly increasing (decreasing) one of his bids bij. But this is
impossible in an SPNE.
Step D. In any SPNE outcome of -CBM any player i ∈ N obtains as final payoff his
Owen value.
Assume that players are playing according to some SPNE. Given i ∈ Cl ∈ C, we denote
by pi the final payoff obtained by player i in this SPNE.
By Step B, we know that any player of Cl is the proposer with probability
1∣Cl∣ .
If player i is the proposer, we know, by Step A, that his final payoff is
∑
j∈Cl φj (N,C, v) − ∑j∈Cl∖{i}φj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i) + (∣Cl∣ − 1)  − ∑j∈Cl∖{i} bij.
If j ∈ Cl ∖ {i} is the proposer then the final payoff of player i is, by Step A,
bji + φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) − .
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By Step C, we know that ∣Cl∣pi =
∑
j∈Cl φj (N,C, v) − ∑j∈Cl∖{i}φj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i) + (∣Cl∣ − 1)  − ∑j∈Cl∖{i} bij+ ∑
j∈Cl∖{i} (bji + φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) − ) .







i = −Bi = 0.
Hence, ∣Cl∣pi =
∑
j∈Cl∖{i} (φi (N ∖ {j},C−j, v−j) − φj (N ∖ {i},C−i, v−i)) + ∑j∈Cl φj (N,C, v) .
Since the Owen value satisfies the property of balanced contributions among coalitions,
we have that
∣Cl∣pi = ∑
j∈Cl∖{i} (φi (N,C, v) − φj (N,C, v)) + ∑j∈Cl φj (N,C, v)= (∣Cl∣ − 1)φi (N,C, v) − ∑
j∈Cl∖{i}φj (N,C, v) + ∑j∈Cl φj (N,C, v)= ∣Cl∣φi (N,C, v) .
Then pi = φi (N,C, v). This finishes the proof of Theorem 1. ∎
Remark 5. In the ε-CBM, if an offer is rejected, the proposer and the responder who
rejects the offer have a punishment. It is easy to check that the result is also true if only
proposers (or responders) have a punishment.
Theorem 1 also holds if the punishment to the proposer is agent-dependent, i. e. any
agent i has a punishment εi > 0 for being removed from the game.
We have just proved that if we make assumptions about player’s behavior, which
appears in the ε-CBM, we can implement the Owen value in the class of superadditive
games.
As we said before, another way to avoid the multiplicity of payoffs associated to
SPNE outcomes in the CBM associated to superadditive games is to find a subclass of
such games where the Owen value is the unique payoff associated to SPNE outcomes.
We have the following result:
Theorem 2. The CBM implements the Owen value in SPNE for strictly superaddi-
tive games.
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Proof. We already know, by Proposition 2, that there is an SPNE outcome of CBM
whose payoff is the Owen value.
Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 we can prove that
the payoff associated to every SPNE outcome coincides with the Owen value. ∎
Remark 6. A natural question that arises is: what happens if in Round 1 coalitions
announce nothing? (in CBM they announce if there is an agreement or some player is
removed). This means that players in a coalition have no information about what happens
in other coalitions. Later, in Round 2, the representative of any coalition announces to
the other representatives the resources that he has. We call this non-cooperative game
the ”simultaneous coalitional bidding mechanism” (SCBM). We also define the -SCBM
in the same way that we have done with the -CBM.
Note that the only subgames in SCBM and -SCBM are the whole game and those
obtained after Round 2.
Using similar arguments to those used in Proposition 2, it is easy to prove that the
Owen value is the payoff associated to some SPNE outcome of SCBM and -SCBM.
Nevertheless, we have no uniqueness as we can see in the following example, which
works in SCBM and -SCBM. We take (N,C, v), where N = {1,2,3,4}, C = {C1,C2},
C1 = {1,2}, C2 = {3,4}, v(S) = 100 if ∣S∣ = 4, and v(S) = 0 if ∣S∣ < 4.
We consider the following strategies:
Round 1. Players of C1 play as follows: in Stage 1 b12 = b21 = 0; in Stage 2 the proposer,
α1, offers y
α1
i = 0 if i ≠ 1 and yα1i = 50 if i = 1, any player j ∈ C1 ∖ {α1} accepts an offer
y if and only if yα1i = 0 if i ≠ 1 and yα1i = 50 if i = 1. Players of C2 play according to the
strategies defined in Proposition 2.
Round 2. The representatives play according to the strategies described in Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), which implement the Shapley value.
It is not difficult to prove that these strategies are an SPNE. Moreover, they induce
as final payoff (50,0,25,25). The Owen value is (25,25,25,25).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we define the coalitional bidding mechanism, which generalizes the bidding
mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) for situations where players are par-
titioned into fixed groups. We prove that for superadditive games there always exists an
SPNE whose payoff outcome coincides with the Owen value. However, unlike the result of
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Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) on implementation of the Shapley value, there exist
SPNE whose payoff outcome is different from the Shapley value. But if we restrict the
behavior of agents (as in Moldovanu and Winter (1994) or Hart and Mas-Colell (1996))
or we restrict the class of games (to strictly superadditive games), we can implement the
Owen value.
5 References
Calvo E., Lasaga J., Winter E. (1996) The principle of balanced contributions and hier-
archies of cooperation. Mathematical Social Sciences 31: 171-182.
Carreras F., Owen G. (1988) Evaluation of the Catalonian parliament 1980-1984. Math-
ematical Social Sciences 15: 87-92.
Gul F. (1989) Bargaining foundations of Shapley value. Econometrica 57: 81-95.
Hart S., Mas-Colell A. (1989) Potential, value, and consistency. Econometrica 57: 589-
614.
Hart S., Mas-Colell A. (1996) Bargaining and value. Econometrica 64: 357-380.
Moldovanu B., Winter E. (1994) Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for
cooperation. Journal of Mathematical Economics 23: 533-548.
Myerson R.B. (1980) Conference structures and fair allocation rules. International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 9: 169-182.
Owen G. (1977) Values of games with a priori unions. In: Henn R., Moeschlin O. (eds)
Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg
New York: 76-88.
Pe´rez-Castrillo D., Wettstein D. (2001) Bidding for the surplus: A non-cooperative ap-
proach to the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Theory 100: 274-294.
Shapley S. (1953) A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn H.W., Tucker A.W. (eds)
Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ:
307-317.
Va´zquez-Brage M., Van den Nouweland A., Garc´ıa-Jurado I. (1997) Owen’s coalitional
value and aircraft landing fees. Mathematical Social Sciences 34: 273-286.
Winter E. (1992) The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition struc-
ture. Games and Economic Behavior 4: 132-144.
18
